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Throughout the country, we are seeing sentencing reform efforts re-
shape the way resources are being used to control crime and punish
offenders. Fueled mostly by the practical challenges of overcrowded
prisons and mounting costs, lawmakers have been willing to amend existing
law in order to reduce incarceration for low-level, nonviolent offenders.2
This same effort at being "smart on crime" has been embraced by the federal
government as well.3 While most of these changes are in the form of
changes to mandatory minimum laws, the use of evidence-based sentencing
* Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. Professor Jefferson Exum would like
to thank the law firm, Eastman & Smith, Ltd., for providing research support and funding her
interview travel through its Faculty Scholarship Support Award.
1. See, e.g., Marc A. Levin, Smart on Crime: With Prison Costs on the Rise, Ohio
Needs Better Policies for Protecting the Future, BUCKEYE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y. SOLUTIONS
(Nov. 2010), http://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/uploads/files/buckeye-smart-on-crime (1).pdf.
2. Id. at 12-13.
3. For example, in 2013 the U.S. Attorney General launched a "Smart on Crime"
initiative, designed to "identify reforms that would ensure federal laws are enforced more
fairly and in an era of reduced budgets more efficiently." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SMART ON CRIME INITIATIVE (2013).
453
1
Exum: Giving Guidance to the Guidelines
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
practices, and a focus on diversion and re-entry programs, the role that the
actual sentencers the judges play in the process should not be ignored.
Any reform of federal sentencing necessarily requires reforming the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines to incorporate those changes. However, now that the
sentencing guidelines are advisory, judges can follow their own policy
rationales in deciding what sentences are reasonable for each offender before
them.5 Therefore, though Congress may have made certain changes to
sentencing law, and the Attorney General may have shifted law enforcement
and punishment priorities, when it comes to individual sentencing decisions,
judges are free to follow their own vision of sentencing reform. While
judicial sentencing discretion has its benefits when it comes to
individualizing sentences, unfortunately, judges often do not have enough
relevant information to adequately determine what amount and type of
punishment is appropriate to achieve punishment goals. However, my
interviews with federal district judges indicate that many judges are very
open to receiving such information. Thus, federal sentencing reform efforts
should include the development of a way to effectively deliver information
about sentencing goals and purposes to district judges. The Guidelines could
be used to accomplish this task, but that would require allowing the needs of
judges to give guidance to the Guidelines.
In the decade since the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines became advisory
under U.S. v. Booker,6 much attention has been paid to the frequency with
which federal district judges still sentence within those Guidelines. The
U.S. Sentencing Commission has undoubtedly spent valuable time and
resources in meetings, research, and data collection for the Guidelines, yet
those judges who have chosen to depart from the applicable Guidelines
ranges do so because they find a non-Guidelines sentence to be reasonable
and in line with the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors in a specific case or for a
specific set of offenses.9 While it may be the case that the Guidelines could
never (and perhaps should not aim to) capture all of the factors that judges
4. See, e.g., NAT'L GOVERNOR'S Ass'N., NAT'L GOVERNOR'S Ass'N. CTR. FOR BEST
PRACTICES, STATE EFFORTS IN SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS REFORM 2-5 (2011).
5. See United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85, 85 (2007).
6. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
7. Each year the Sentencing Commission publishes Federal Sentencing Statistics,
including data on sentences imposed and their relation to the applicable Guidelines ranges. For
example, see U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N., FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 2015 (Apr.
2016).
8. See infra note 26.
9. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N., AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES (2016) (explaining that judges may depart from the guideline range in certain
situations).
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may find compelling in a precise case, this Article argues that more focus
needs to be paid to what can be learned from the instances in which judges
depart from the Guidelines.'o These departures may teach us valuable
lessons about what motivates judges in their sentencing decisions and will
allow the Commission to determine whether certain sentencing factors and
considerations should be included, deleted, or altered in the Guidelines
calculations."
This Article explores the Author's findings gathered in the course of
several interviews with federal district judges throughout the country. While
the Guidelines remain a significant force in sentencing, sentencing judges
have a host of opinions regarding the utility and reliability of their content.
As this Article explains, many of the reasons for the variety of those views
are founded on varied perceptions of the transparency (or lack thereof) of the
Guideline range determination process, and the ease (or lack thereof) of
access to information regarding sentencing ranges, factors, and other data
from the Sentencing Commission. Ultimately, this Article argues that there
is an opportunity for the Sentencing Commission to revamp the Guidelines
to satisfy the criticisms of skeptical judges and to bolster the usefulness of
the Guidelines even for judges who are already inclined to find Guidelines
range sentences reasonable in many cases. Such a re-envisioning of the
Sentencing Guidelines as responsive to the needs of sentencing judges will
allow judges to more consistently and effectively fulfill the requirement that
they impose reasonable sentences that reflect the § 3553(a) factors. In this
way, judges can be brought into the fold of sentencing reform.
I. GUIDELINES RESPONSES TO SENTENCING REFORM
When federal sentencing laws change, so do the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines. While some changes to the Guidelines are based on the
Sentencing Commission's desire to clarify language or to bring Guidelines
provisions more in line with the Commission's policy statements, a number
of Guidelines amendments are a response to Congressional changes to
sentencing laws. In a recent report of Guidelines amendments that will take
effect in November 2016, the Commission listed several changes to the
10. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N., AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
(effective Nov. 1, 2016) (explaining that the reasons for some of the proposed amendments are
in response to changes in sentencing laws). The full updated 2016 Guidelines Manual can be
found at http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2016-guidelines-manual.




Exum: Giving Guidance to the Guidelines
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Guidelines that were based on new offenses or changes in punishment.12 For
example, in 2008 and 2014, Congress made changes to the Animal Welfare
Act, including increasing the punishment for certain animal fighting offenses
and creating two new offenses related to attending animal fights.13 In
response, the Sentencing Commission adopted new Guidelines provisions
that increased the base offense level for those animal fighting offenses
receiving harsher punishment and created a base offense level for the new
offenses.14 The Commission also developed new departure Guidelines for
these offenses.'5 Thus, when judges sentence for these changed offenses,
they will have new Guidelines provisions to consult. 1 In developing these
new provisions, the Sentencing Commission explains that it is informed by
public commentary and testimony, as well as other data relevant to
sentencing such as the frequency that certain lengths of sentences are
imposed. Therefore, when judges sentence in cases of these new or
changed offenses, they are not only consulting new Guidelines, they are
consulting new Guidelines that are the basis of thorough research and
extensive deliberation.
The research and data collection undertaken by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission often results in Guidelines being ahead of Congress in taking
progressive sentencing reform stances. The animal fighting offenses provide
an example of Congress increasing punishment, even in the face of trends
toward reducing incarceration. The Sentencing Commission, though,
sometimes urges Congress to reduce punishment when its research shows
that current sentencing laws are out of line with justice and fairness. A clear
example of this Guidelines-led reform is the story of cocaine offense
sentencing. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 imposed the infamous 100 to
1 crack to powder cocaine sentencing ratio, which required 100 times more
powder cocaine to trigger the same mandatory minimum sentence applicable
to crack cocaine trafficking offenses.1 The criticisms of the Act were
immediate and continued for decades. Those criticisms focused mainly on
12. Id
13. Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, § 12308, 128 Stat. 990, 990 (2014);
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 14207(b), 122 Stat.
1461, 1462 (2008).
14. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N., supra note 10, at 6-8.
15. Id at 9.
16. Id at 6-8.
17. Id
18. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986);
See generally Jelani Jefferson Exum, Forget Sentencing Equality: Moving From the
"Cracked" Cocaine Debate Toward Particular Purpose Sentencing, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REv. 95, 102-05 (2014) (explaining the development of this ratio).
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the disparate racial impact that the 100 to 1 ratio created.19 The Sentencing
Commission was among those repeatedly calling for Congress to reform
these racially biased drug sentencing laws. The Sentencing Commission
issued recommendations to Congress to change crack cocaine sentencing in
20
February and May of 1995, again in 1997, and yet again in 2002 and 2004.
In each instance, Congress failed to answer with any cocaine sentencing
reform. Finally, in 2007, the Commission took matters into its own hands
and enacted a series of Guidelines' amendments to deal with this sentencing
disparity issue. Amendment 706, effective November 1, 2007, reduced by
two levels the base offense level for most crack offenses.21 As the
Commission noted when it enacted Amendment 706:
The Commission, however, views the amendment only as a partial
remedy to some of the problems associated with the 100-to-i drug
quantity ratio. It is neither a permanent nor a complete solution to
those problems. Any comprehensive solution requires appropriate
legislative action by Congress. It is the Commission's firm desire
19. See, e.g., Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: "De-Coding" Colorblind Slurs
During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 613 (1999)
(arguing that "members of Congress and the media 'coded' messages to gain support for the
passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986"); Knoll D. Lowney, Smoked Not Snorted: Is
Racism Inherent in Our Crack Cocaine Laws?, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 121, 121
(1994) (discussing the rate of incarceration among African Americans with drug-related
crimes, demographics of crack cocaine users, and failure by the Federal government o provide
equal protection to all races); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus
Criminality: Or Why the "War on Drugs" was a "War on Blacks", 6 J. GENDER, RACE &
JUSTICE 381, 397 (2002) (discussing the history of the war on drugs and resulting racial
implications); see also Marcia G. Shein, Race and Crack Cocaine Offense: Correcting A
Troubling Injustice Post-Booker, CHAMPION, Apr. 2007, at 18.
20. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for U.S. Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25075
(May 10, 1995); U.S. SENTENCING COMM., 105TH CONG., SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1997); U.S. SENTENCING COMM., 107TH
CONG., REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 1-14 (2002);
U.S. SENTENCING COMM., 108TH CONG., FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING
(2004).
21. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for U.S. Courts, 72 Fed. Reg.
51882-83 (Sept. 11, 2007) (assigning a base offense level to every federal criminal offense).
Chapter Three of the Sentencing Guidelines also included several sections of adjustments that
add points to the base offense level based on particular offense factors and offender conduct
(i.e., role in the offense, type of victim, etc.) because the Sentencing Commission adopted a
system of "real offense sentencing." The sum of the total offense level which corresponds to
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that this report will facilitate prompt congressional action
22addressing the 100-to-i drug quantity ratio.
Though it took three years, the Commission's hope for Congressional
action was finally realized. The resulting Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (the
"FSA") decreased the powder to crack cocaine sentencing ratio to nearly
18:1.23 During this period of discourse that eventually led to reform, some
district court judges were acting out their own ideas about sentencing
fairness. Judicial responses to the crack-powder cocaine sentencing
disparities indicate that, for some judges, the guidelines were not providing
enough valuable guidance in this sentencing area.
II. How JUDGES RESPOND TO NEEDS FOR REFORM
To understand how sentencing judges respond to their perception that
sentencing reform is needed, one must first think about the context in which
federal district judges are making their sentencing decisions. In 2005, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided U.S. v. Booker, in which it solved the then-
mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guideline's violation of the Sixth Amendment
24jury trial right by making the Guidelines advisory. District judges must still
calculate and consider the applicable Guidelines range for each case, but
then the judge is free to impose any reasonable sentence, even if it is one
outside of the applicable Guidelines range.25 To be reasonable, a sentence
must comport with the sentencing factors delineated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).26 In the years following Booker, the Supreme Court had to clarify
what limits there would be to a judge's sentencing discretion.
22. Id.
23. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2010)).
24. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005).
25. United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 39 (2007).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2014). Pursuant to the relevant parts of 18. U.S.C. § 3553(a),
sentencing courts shall consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed ... to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment . .. ; to afford adequate
deterrence ... ; to protect the public ... ; to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or correctional treatment;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence[s] and the sentencing range established for ... the ... offense;
(5) any pertinent policy statement ... issued by the Sentencing Commission;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to ... victims." Id
458 [VOL. 6 8: 45 3
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One particularly important case that opened the door for judge-made
27sentencing reform was the 2007 case, U.S. v. Kimbrough. In that case, the
Supreme Court held that district courts "may consider the disparity between
the Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses" in deciding
how to sentence a defendant.28 After explaining the history and development
of the cocaine sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme Court stated:
The crack cocaine Guidelines, however, present no occasion for
elaborative discussion of this matter because those Guidelines do
not exemplify the Commission's exercise of its characteristic
institutional role. In formulating Guidelines ranges for crack
cocaine offenses, as we earlier noted, the Commission looked to the
mandatory minimum sentences set in the 1986 Act, and did not take
account of "empirical data and national experience." Indeed, the
Commission itself has reported that the crack/powder disparity
produces disproportionately harsh sanctions, i.e., sentences for
crack cocaine offenses "greater than necessary" in light of the
purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a). Given all this, it
would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude
when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder
disparity yields a sentence "greater than necessary" to achieve
§ 3553(a)'s purposes, even in a mine-run case.29
In other words, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, when it came to
cocaine sentencing, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines did not give adequate
guidance toward a reasonable sentence. And, as the Court pointed out, even
the U.S. Sentencing Commission agreed with the potential failure of the
Guidelines in this area. In the 2009 case Spears v. U.S., the Supreme Court
re-iterated its Kimbrough holding by clarifying that it is permissible for a
sentencing judge to come up with his or her own sentencing ratio for cocaine
offenses.30 The door was open for judges to act as sentencing reformers, but
from where they would draw their guidance was unclear.
Several sentencing judges took this freedom and ran with it regularly
departing from the Guidelines in crack cocaine cases as well as in the cases
of other offenses for which the judges felt the Sentencing Guidelines would
27. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
28. Id. at 85.
29. Id. at 109-10 (internal citations omitted).
30. 555 U.S. 261, 265-66 (2009). As the Court explained in Spears, however, while a
sentencing judges may impose her own sentencing ratio, she is still bound by the mandatory
minimum sentencing laws for crack and powder cocaine offenses. Id. at 267.
2017] 459
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be unreasonable. When it came to sentencing crack cocaine offenders, some
judges looked at the information available and created their own ratio. For
Judge Lynn Adelman in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, that ratio was
20:1, which he adopted based on the Commission's recommendation to
Congress at the time.31 Several other judges have chosen the same course.32
For other judges, the plan of attack was to impose complete parity thus
adopting a 1:1 sentencing ratio in cocaine cases. For instance, Judge Mark
W. Bennett in the Northern District of Iowa (the sentencing judge in Spears)
first decided to implement a 1:1 sentencing ratio for crack and powder
cocaine offenders in 2009, prior to the FSA.33 He has maintained the
commitment to that parity since the FSA imposed the 18:1 ratio. In the 2011
case, U.S. v. Williams,34 Judge Bennett explained that he adopted a 1:1 ratio
in the first place "on policy grounds, for several reasons, not least of which
were the failure of the Sentencing Commission to exercise its characteristic
institutional role in developing the Guidelines, the lack of support for the
assumptions that apparently motivated adoption of the ratio, and the
disparate impact of the ratio on black offenders."35 Once the FSA changed
the ratio to 18:1, which was also reflected in the Sentencing Guidelines,
Judge Bennett expressed a disappointment with the lack of expert reasoning
for settling upon this new ratio. Judge Bennett explained:
When I first learned that the 2010 FSA was about to be passed, I
just assumed that I would change my opinion from a 1:1 ratio to the
new 18:1 ratio, because I assumed that Congress would have had
persuasive evidence-or at least some empirical or other
evidence before it as the basis to adopt that new ratio. I likewise
assumed that the Sentencing Commission would have brought its
institutional expertise and empirical evidence to bear, both in
31. United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d771, 781-82 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 308 (D.R.I 2005) (adopting a
20:1 ratio); see also United States v. Castillo, No. 03 CR 835, 2005 WL 1214280, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (adopting a 20:1 ratio); United States v. Clay, No. 2:03CR73, 2005 WL
1076243, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. 2005) (rejecting the 100:1 ratio).
33. United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637 (N.D. Iowa 2009). The Defendant
pleaded guilty to one count of distributing less than four grams of crack cocaine and three
counts of distributing less than four grams of crack within 1,000 feet of a public playground or
school after having previously been convicted of a felony. Judge Bennett sentenced the
defendant to eighty-four months of incarceration instead of selecting a sentence within the
100:1 Guidelines range of 108-135 months. Id.
34. See United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (criminal
drug case where Judge Bennett applied a 1:1 crack-to-power ratio when deciding an
appropriate sentence for the defendant).
35. Id at 853.
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advising Congress and in adopting crack cocaine Sentencing
36Guidelines based on the 18:1 ratio.
What is clear from Judge Bennett's opinion is that he considered the
new ratio imposed by the FSA was just as arbitrarily decided as the
problematic 100:1 ratio. What we learn from the responses of all of these
judges who forged out on their own to reform cocaine sentencing is that the
Sentencing Guidelines did not provide them with the sentencing information
they deemed relevant.
III. WHEN JUDGES QUESTION SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PRELIMINARY
RESEARCH FINDING
As part of my research for an upcoming book project entitled,
Sentencing with Purpose: Conversations with Judges, I have interviewed
federal district judges across the country regarding their sentencing
philosophies and practices.37 This project will highlight what judges feel
they need (and what they in fact need) in order to sentence with the purposes
they, and society, hope to achieve through the criminal justice system. As
the tide of sentencing reform is turning toward giving judges even more
discretion in sentencing, it is vitally important to give judges the sentencing
resources and support that they need to sentence with purpose. Each chapter
of the book will address a different issue raised by the judges, including: (1)
developing consistency in sentencing purpose through sentencing
collaboration among judges; (2) the use of sentencing expert witnesses at
sentencing hearings; (3) the appropriate and inappropriate use of studies in
sentencing; and (4) dealing with the obstacles of incorporating purpose
sentencing in an age of mandatory minimum sentencing. Within all of these
topics, the use of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is relevant and came up
regularly in my discussions with the judges.
It is important to note that many federal district judges both trust and
appreciate the guidance given in the Sentencing Guidelines. During several
interviews, judges noted the extensive research conducted by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission and the value of much of the information that can
36. Id. at 849-50.
37. As of the time of this Article's publication, I have interviewed 20 federal district
judges, spanning 14 federal districts and covering 8 federal circuits, with an ever-growing list
of judges who have committed to being interviewed. Before publication of the final book
project, judges have the option of remaining anonymous or having either ideas or direct quotes
attributed to them. Because these anonymity elections are still pending, I will not identify any
of the participating judges to whom I refer in this Article.
2017] 461
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be found on the Commission's website and in its publications. Therefore, the
focus of this Article is not to suggest that the Sentencing Commission does
not provide any meaningful information to sentencing judges. Rather, the
purpose of sharing my findings is to think about what can be learned from
those instances in which judges question the usefulness of the Guidelines,
and how those lessons might be incorporated into the larger sentencing
reform discussion. With that in mind, the following are the types of
criticisms of the Sentencing Guidelines that judges have shared with me
during our interview sessions.
A. Overall Concerns About Sentencing Guidelines
Some district judges have problems with sentencing guidelines in
general and will likely always take issue with them, regardless of their form.
One judge said she had "never been a fan" of sentencing guidelines; another
said that he found guidelines to be "unnecessary." These comments reflect a
view that judges ought to be trusted to make sentencing decisions based on
the information before them, and that judges are capable of making
appropriate sentencing decisions without needing sentencing guidelines. Of
course, judges with this view understand that they are required by law to
calculate and consider the applicable Guidelines range for all cases before
them. They are simply indicating that they do not find much value in that
exercise and are not of the opinion that the uniformity goal of sentencing
guidelines is either achievable or necessary. Other judges, however, pointed
to concerns that they have specifically about the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
Those judges who have criticisms, particularly about the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, often refer to the complexity of the Guidelines
themselves. One judge called them the "so-called Guidelines" because
having so many factors ends up making them no help at all in creating
uniformity. Others note this complexity as proof that the Guidelines contain
many irrelevant factors, making the final range "unreliable" in many cases.
While there are certainly judges who find the complexity of the Guidelines
admirable, even some of those judges thought that the Guidelines got the
punishment "calibration wrong", leading to sentences that are often longer
than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing. These judges all
indicate an overall uneasiness about the sentencing guidelines, which tends
to cause them to doubt the reasonableness of Guidelines sentence in any
particular case. When it comes to thinking about sentencing reform, these
judges are telling us that they are looking for reliable information to use in
making their sentencing decisions, but they do not always believe that the
Guidelines are providing such material.
462 [VOL. 6 8: 45 3
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B. Particular Aspects of the Guidelines More Suspicious Than Others
For several judges, even if they had an overall appreciation for the
Guidelines, they believed that there were certain aspects of the Sentencing
Guidelines that regularly provided less reliable and relevant information than
other parts of the Guidelines. The two culprits that were usually raised as
"suspicious" were the portions of the Guidelines applicable to drug offenses,
and those applicable to child pornography possession and receipt offenses.
Here are some of the highly critical perceptions that some district judges
have of the drug Guidelines: "drug sentences are out of control"; "drug
Guidelines are out of whack"; "Guidelines are obsessed with drug
quantities"; and "these Guidelines are being used to drive prison populations
and destroy lives." These are quite serious indictments. To be fair, when it
comes to drug quantities, the Guidelines have been reflective of
Congressional directives and highly-punitive mandatory minimum
sentencing laws. The same is true for child pornography Guidelines, which
one judges referred to as "astronomical for political reasons." However,
what is important to gather from judicial commentary is the impression that
judges have about the reliability of the Guidelines for drug offenses. For
those critical of these Guidelines, their tendency is to discount the
Guidelines' relevance. If the Sentencing Commission feels that there is
important information being offered in the drug offense Guidelines, then that
message must be communicated to judges. As sentencing judges continue to
reform sentencing on their own, it is to the Commission's advantage to
provide information to judges in ways that explain how the data behind the
Guidelines finds its way into the Guidelines ranges that judges are required
to consider.
C. Criticism Regarding the Development of Guidelines
A recurring theme that was raised in my conversations with judges was
the concern that much of the Sentencing Guidelines is not empirically based.
Some judges seemed to express a feeling of betrayal about this, with one
saying, "They told us all of the guidelines are empirically based, but that's
not true . . . they aren't." For those judges concerned about this aspect of the
Guidelines development, the thought was that, what could be useful about
sentencing guidelines would be if they were indicating what other judges
were actually doing. In other words, for a Guidelines sentence to reflect the
"heartland" of cases, it should be representative of the types of sentences
that other judges were imposing. The difficulty with this view, of course, is
that for nearly two decades judges have been required to sentence within the
Guideline range except in very specific instances. As one judge put it,
2017] 463
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"unfortunately the Guidelines provide an anchor/base that in some cases is
completely an artificial construct of the politics of that time, so you have to
sentence against that backdrop." Though still imperfect, one suggestion to
deal with this is to begin now with a re-do at empirically based Guidelines.
If judges' current sentencing practices, including those instances when
judges are regularly departing from the applicable Guidelines range, were
reflected in revised Guidelines ranges, then at least some judges would find
that more useful than Guidelines that are divorced from current practice and
seem to miss certain aspects of judicial concern. One judge commented that
in this post-Booker era, the only way she can figure out what other judges
are doing is to get statistics from the Commission by asking the Commission
to run certain data points for her. Though she noted that the Commission
makes this information available to any judge who may want it, she also
indicated that it takes time and effort to get this information given the way it
is currently collected and stored. Judges of this view are looking for the
Guidelines themselves to already incorporate statistics on judicial sentencing
practices.
D. The Missing Pieces of the Guidelines
In addition to wishing that the Sentencing Guidelines ranges mirrored
judges' own sentencing decisions and concerns, several judges indicated that
the Guidelines were missing other key pieces of information about which
they cared in making their sentencing determinations. More than one judge
indicated a concern about a defendant's history of violence and noted that
there was no history of violence upward departure in the Guidelines
calculation. One judge said that the when it came to protecting the public,
the Guidelines are "woefully inadequate about taking into account violence
and history of violence." For other judges, it was general information about
a defendant's background which the judge wished had a place for
consideration within the Guidelines calculation. In deciding whether a
defendant's background justified a below-guidelines sentence, some judges
wished that the Commission would give guidance on how certain
background factors play into recidivism and dangerousness. While all of this
may be a tall order for the Commission to accomplish, these comments from
judges indicate that many judges are looking for the Sentencing Guidelines
to present information different in kind and format than what the
Commission has done since 1986.
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GIVING GUIDANCE TO THE GUIDELINES
IV. CONCLUSION: JUDGES, SENTENCING REFORM, AND THE POTENTIAL OF
THE GUIDELINES
For many judges, an ultimate concern about the Sentencing Guidelines
is that there has not been a guiding purpose in federal sentencing. But, there
is certainly a desire among judges to have the Sentencing Commission think
about sentencing goals and to tailor the Guidelines to achieving those goals.
As one judge put it, "if we take recidivism, the Sentencing Commission
could concentrate on that; if you wanted to put in a rehabilitative ideal, then
the Sentencing Commission could be doing more with that." What one can
take from all of these conversations with judges is that judges are open to
information. They are all trying to come to the "right" sentence for
defendants and they welcome statistics and data-driven reports about
sentencing. However, there are several district judges who do not feel as
though the Sentencing Guidelines are regularly providing them with
information that helps them to accomplish their mandated sentencing goal of
imposing a reasonable sentence. For those judges, the options are to look to
information provided elsewhere, or to their own sentencing experience, to
decide on appropriate sentences. While these approaches may not
necessarily be a bad thing, there is a missed opportunity when it comes to
sentencing reform. As trends continue toward reducing incarceration and re-
focusing resources to address recidivism and to reduce over-punishment on
low-level offenders, judges should be brought into the fold in more
consistent ways. Rather than leaving it up to judges to determine for
themselves on a case-by-case basis whether a sentencing policy put forth by
the Guidelines is too harsh, the Guidelines can be adapted to present
information to judges that would show how the Guidelines are responding to
those sentencing reform trends and objectives. Of course, it would be
necessary for the Sentencing Guidelines to actually be doing this before such
a message could be communicated to judges. And, perhaps that is the most
useful lesson presented by these conversations with judges-that the
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